versed, reasoning that since the trusts had not been created in consideration for each other, the wife's powers over the husband's trusts did not render them taxable to her. ' Had the powers of alteration not been crossed--i.e., had each reserved to himself the powers over the trust which he or she createdwithout doubt the corpus would have been taxable to the grantor's estate.
7 Accordingly, the instant decision is difficult to justify rationally. It is supported, however, by a long line of decisions, beginning with Lehman v. Commissioner' in 194o. In that case, both Allan and Harold Lehman simultaneously created substantially identical trusts giving the other a life estate and a limited power to invade the corpus. When Harold died, the commissioner included in his gross estate the sum which he had been empowered to withdraw from the corpus of the trusts created by Allan.' The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed'° on the ground that the decedent's power to invade the corpus of Allan's trusts was equivalent to a power to invade his own, and that it was thus an interest in property of which the decedent had "made a transfer . .. where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to a change through the exercise of a power ... to alter, amend, or revoke cross trusts, exchanging the same power so that there is in substance a transfer by the decedent. , . ,"" taxable under section 302(d) of the 1926 Act.' 2 The Court of Appeals affirmed,' 3 but for substantially different reasons. Relying on the settled rule of trust law that "the person who furnishes the consideration for a trust is the settlor even though in form the trust was created by another person," 4 the court held that Harold was the "true settlor" of the trusts of which Allan was the named settlor, and to the extent that Harold could invade the corpus of the trusts of which he was the "true settlor," they were includable in his gross estate.' 5 It is not apparent why the court substituted its quid pro quo rationale for the approach of economic equivalence followed by the Board of Tax Appeals. Nevertheless, that substitution has had profound effect upon subsequent reciprocal trust cases, for it has made the earmark of taxability one of subjective intent rather than of economic consequences1--and this area of subjective intent, nebulous in any context, is especially fraught with difficulties in applying the Estate Tax.' 7 Usually, the transfer has occurred years before the matter reaches litigation, the party whose intent is in issue is dead, and surviving parties who would be best qualified to testify concerning the intent of the decedent are frequently either scattered or dead, or their testimony is of little probative value because of obvious self-interest. The problem is further aggravated by the fact that in the peculiar circumstances surrounding the creation of typical reciprocal trusts, it is quite probable that no dearly defined intent may be discernible. Therefore, courts have been forced to infer this intent largely from objective i Scor, TRUSTS § 156.3 (1939) . 1" Perhaps one reason why the court was prone to adopt this particular rationale is that it was made easy by a stipulation of counsel before the Board of Tax Appeals that the trusts were created in consideration for one another. 39 B.T.A. I7, 20 (1939) . This may be cited as an easy case that made bad law, because very few cases have arisen since the Lehman decision in which this unfortunate stipulation has been made. But cf.
Estate of Thomas Neal, P-H 1943 TC MEM. DEC. 43,518 (1943) 
19s51
NO TES data and circumstances surrounding the transfer,"' the most significant of which would seem to be the fact that the trusts arose out of a close family relationship." 9 Other facts which have supported inferences of reciprocity have been the proximity of times of creation, 2° the identity of trustees and legal advisors to the respective grantors,"' the similarity of trust instruments 22 and of subsequent amendatory action, 23 and the correspondence in amounts of the respective trusts; 24 and although no one of these factors is generally held to control the question, their cumulative effect has been considerable. "But the facts that the trusts were executed at the same time, were in substantially equal amounts, and had similar provisions are not conclusive that the trusts were interdependent and were executed in consideration for each other." " This has long been the experience of the courts which have dealt with transfers in contemplation of death under what is now § 2035 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, the wording of which makes a subjective inquiry practically unavoidable.
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NOTES
In view of the demonstrated inadequacy of the quid pro quo rationale as an impediment to tax avoidance, the question arises whether such a treatment is necessary to preserve the integrity of the Estate Tax. The general climate set by the more recent cases seems to indicate that it is not. 27 Helvering v. Clifford 28 is illustrative here. The crux of the decision to tax the grantor of the trust in that case was the fact that he had not changed his economic position by reason of the transfer. 29 There is no apparent reason why such an enlightened view should not be adopted in cases involving reciprocal trusts. The fact that the transferor's economic position has not been changed by the creation of the trusts would seem sufficient to justify subjecting him to the provisions of the Estate Tax governing inter vivos transfers 30 Such an approach has gained the approval of the courts in numerous cases involving the constitutionality of federal tax measures, 3 ' and surely it could appropriately be applied in this instance. 3 In at least four cases involving reciprocal trusts, the courts have found the consideration rationale either inadequate or illusory and have deviated from the supposed technical confines of the Lehnn doctrine. In Werner A. Weiboldt, 33 an income tax case, 34 there was For a discussion of the difficulties involved in such a subjective inquiry see the dissent- "Unfortunate situations have resulted in the past when courts have refused to give the Estate Tax the liberal construction which the purpose of the tax would seem to dictate. The prime example is May v. Heiner, zS, U.S. 238 (1930), where it was held that the reservation of a life estate was not taxable as a transfer "taking effect at death," because, under property concepts, the remainder vested at the time of the transfer.
5 T.C. 946 (945). " There is no significant difference between the considerations involved in the reciprocal trust situation under the estate and income taxes. See Colgan and Molloy, op. cit. supra note 3, at 287.
